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25/02/2009 House Prices Compared: What USD $500,000 Buys Worldwidehttp://www.moneycompare.com.au/blog/house-prices-compared-what-usd-500000-buy-worldwide.php
The international housing market has practically stalled over the past year and in some countries prices have fallen through the floor. With a considerable drop in prices, now is the ideal time to buy that new home or holiday house. Lets imagine you are upwardly mobile and have around US$500,000 (AU$770,000) to invest. It may not stretch as far as it used to, but you can still get some stunning properties in exotic locations. Take a look at these gorgeous properties in across the globe and see just what you can get for your money. Turkey: Kalkan, Mediterranean Sea
Thailand: Bang Saray, South Jomtien
Indonesia: Canggu, Bali
USA: West Rice Street, Chicago
Costa Rica: Playa Tamarindo
New Zealand: Albany, Auckland
Australia: Surrey Hills, Sydney
Brazil: Bombinhas, Santa Catarina
Caribbean Islands: Bon Accord Estate, Tobago
France: Mazemat, South Tarn
Malaysia: Damamsara, Kuala Lumpur
South Africa: Camps Bay, Cape Town
Spain: Sierrezuela, Andalucia
UK: Canary Wharf, London
USA: Manhattan, New York City
USA: Lower Pacific Heights, San Francisco
23/02/2009 George Soros view of the current economic conditionsWe witnessed the collapse of the financial system," Soros told his audience. “It was placed on life support, and it’s still on life support. There’s no sign that we are anywhere near a bottom."
George's views is important to me me because I am reading his latest book, "The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means" 19/02/2009 Reading Feeds with IE8My default feed readers is either the Windows Live Mail or Outlook. However, a co-worker asked me about the ability to pin the favorite bar to the side of internet explorer. This was a big deal for her, although a feature I would hardly ever use. However, in showing her that solution, I discover that with the sidebar pinned this way, Internet Explorer 8 can be a very quick and nice way to scan my blog feeds. Try it and let me know what you think.
13/02/2009 OPEN UP THE SKYVERSE 1 Our beloved Father, Please come down and meet us We are waiting on your touch Open up the heavens, Shower down your presence We respond to your great love Pre-Chorus We won't be satisfied with anything ordinary We won't be satisfied at all Chorus Open up the sky Fall down like rain We don't want blessings we want You Open up the sky fall down like fire We don't want anything but You Verse 2 Our beloved Jesus, We just want to see you In the glory of Your light Earthly things don't matter, They just fade and shatter When we're touched by love divine Pre-Chorus We won't be satisfied with anything ordinary We won't be satisfied at all Chorus Open up the sky Fall down like rain We don't want blessings we want You Open up the sky fall down like fire We don't want anything but You Bridge (repeat) Here we go lets go to the throne The place where we belong Right into His arms Pre-Chorus We won't be satisfied with anything ordinary We won't be satisfied at all Chorus Open up the sky Fall down like rain We don't want blessings we want You Open up the sky fall down like fire We don't want anything but You 10/02/2009 Head of Goldman on why we are in this financial mess in the first place and potential fixSince the spring, and most acutely this autumn, a global contagion of fear and panic has choked off the arteries of finance, compounding a broader deterioration in the global economy. Financial institutions have an obligation to the broader financial system. It is useful to reflect on some of the lessons from this crisis. The first is that risk management should not be entirely predicated on historical data. In the past several months, we have heard the phrase “multiple standard deviation events” more than a few times. If events that were calculated to occur once in 20 years in fact occurred much more regularly, it does not take a mathematician to figure out that risk management assumptions did not reflect the distribution of the actual outcomes. Second, too many financial institutions and investors simply outsourced their risk management. Rather than undertake their own analysis, they relied on the rating agencies to do the essential work of risk analysis for them. This over-dependence on credit ratings coincided with the dilution of the coveted triple A rating. In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated companies in the world. At the same time, there were 64,000 structured finance instruments, such as collateralised debt obligations, rated triple A. Third, size matters, the likelihood of losses maybe proportionally, the same, but the consequences of a miscalculation aremuch bi gger if you had a bigger exposure. Fourth, many risk models incorrectly assumed that positions could be fully hedged. After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management we did not, as an industry, consider carefully enough the possibility that liquidity would dry up, making it difficult to apply effective hedges. Fifth, risk models failed to capture the risk inherent in off-balance sheet activities, such as structured investment vehicles. Sixth, complexity got the better of us. The industry let the growth in new instruments outstrip the operational capacity to manage them. As a result, operational risk increased dramatically and this had a direct effect on the overall stability of the financial system. Last, and perhaps most important, financial institutions did not account for asset values accurately enough. For Goldman Sachs, the daily marking of positions to current market prices was a key contributor to our decision to reduce risk relatively early in markets and in instruments that were deteriorating. This process can be difficult, and sometimes painful, but I believe it is a discipline that should define financial institutions. As a result of these lessons and others that will emerge from this financial crisis, we should consider important principles for our industry, for policymakers and for regulators. For the industry, we cannot let our ability to innovate exceed our capacity to manage. Given the size and interconnected nature of markets, the growth in volumes, the global nature of trades and their cross-asset characteristics, managing operational risk will only become more important. Risk and control functions need to be completely independent from the business units. More generally, we should apply basic standards to how we compensate people in our industry. The percentage of the discretionary bonus awarded in equity should increase significantly as an employee’s total compensation increases. An individual’s performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid excessive risk-taking. To ensure this, all equity awards need to be subject to future delivery and/or deferred exercise. Senior executive officers should be required to retain most of the equity they receive at least until they retire, while equity delivery schedules should continue to apply after the individual has left the firm. For policymakers and regulators, it should be clear that self-regulation has its limits. We rationalised and justified the downward pricing of risk on the grounds that it was different. We did so because our self-interest in preserving and expanding our market share, as competitors, sometimes blinds us – especially when exuberance is at its peak. At the very least, fixing a system-wide problem, elevating standards or driving the industry to a collective response requires effective central regulation and the convening power of regulators. Capital, credit and underwriting standards should be subject to more “dynamic regulation”. Regulators should consider the regulatory inputs and outputs needed to ensure a regime that is nimble and strong enough to identify and appropriately constrain market excesses, particularly in a sustained period of economic growth. Just as the Federal Reserve adjusts interest rates up to curb economic frenzy, various benchmarks and ratios could be appropriately calibrated. To increase overall transparency and help ensure that book value really means book value, regulators should require that all assets across financial institutions be similarly valued. Fair value accounting gives investors more clarity with respect to balance sheet risk. The level of global supervisory co-ordination and communication should reflect the global inter-connectedness of markets. Regulators should implement more robust information sharing and harmonised disclosure, coupled with a more systemic, effective reporting regime for institutions and main market participants. Without this, regulators will lack essential tools to help them understand levels of systemic vulnerability in the banking sector and in financial markets more broadly. In this vein, all pools of capital that depend on the smooth functioning of the financial system and are large enough to be a burden on it in a crisis should be subject to some degree of regulation. After the shocks of recent months and the associated economic pain, there is a natural and appropriate desire for wholesale reform of our regulatory regime. We should resist a response, however, that is solely designed around protecting us from the 100-year storm. Taking risk completely out of the system will be at the cost of economic growth. Similarly, if we abandon, as opposed to regulate, market mechanisms created decades ago, such as securitisation and derivatives, we may end up constraining access to capital and the efficient hedging and distribution of risk, when we ultimately do come through this crisis. Most of the past century was defined by markets and instruments that fund innovation, reward entrepreneurial risk-taking and act as an important catalyst for economic growth. History has shown that a vibrant, dynamic financial system is at the heart of a vibrant, dynamic economy. We collectively have a lot to do to regain the public’s trust and help mend our financial system to restore stability and vitality.
The writer is chief executive of Goldman Sachs, this is is just a paraphrase - if you want to read the whole article go to - http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0a0f1132-f600-11dd-a9ed-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 |
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